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The Determinants of Investment in 
Petroleum Reserves and Their 
Implications for Public Policy 
By JAMES C. COX AND ARTHUR W. WRIGHT* 
Interest in the determinants of invest- 
ment in crude oil and natural gas reserves 
derives from three sources. First, it is al- 
ways interesting to find a satisfactory ex- 
planation of investment behavior in any 
industry. Second, an aspect of the current 
concern with the "energy crisis" is the 
domestic crude petroleum industry's pro- 
ductive capacity, which is an increasing 
function of the stock of proved oil and gas 
reserves. Third, there is a decades-old 
controversy over the special provisions of 
the federal corporation income tax law 
which apply to petroleum producers; those 
special provisions have traditionally been 
justified by an asserted need to increase 
investment in petroleum reserves in order 
to protect "national security."' 
In three previous papers,2 we explored 
the running controversy over the special 
petroleum tax provisions. In our 1973a 
paper, we outlined a framework for de- 
termining whether the special provisions 
were cost effective compared to alternative 
policies for increasing investment in pe- 
troleum reserves.3 We concluded that it 
was impossible to evaluate the policy be- 
cause there were as yet no reliable esti- 
mates of the determinants of investment 
in petroleum reserves. 
In this paper we present a model of in- 
vestment in proved reserves in the U.S. 
crude petroleum producing industry, and 
empirical results for a subsector of that 
industry for 1959-71, using estimating 
equations derived from the model. The 
subsector consists of the five major pe- 
troleum producing states which practice 
"market-demand prorationing."4 The em- 
pirical results indicate that investment in 
petroleum reserves depended on three pub- 
lic policies: the special federal tax pro- 
visions, state market-demand proration- 
ing, and the federal oil import quota. It is 
possible to draw some tentative policy 
conclusions from our empirical results, al- 
* Associate professors of econlomics, University of 
Massachusetts. An earlier draft of this paper was pre- 
sented at the 1973 Winter Meetings of the Econometric 
Society. We want to thank Ronald Ehrenberg, Robert 
Hall, and James Kindahl for helpful advice and criti- 
cism. Valuable programming assistance was provided by 
Donald Barnett, Jr. Partial financial support was pro- 
vided by the Ford Foundation and by the University of 
Massachusetts. Neither institution is responsible for the 
contents of this paper. 
1 The special federal tax provisions for crude petro- 
leum producers are the option to claim "percentage" 
rather than "cost" depletion on producing wells, and the 
option to expense rather than depreciate so-called "in- 
tangible" drilling costs. Compared to uniform tax treat- 
ment of corporate income in all industries, the special 
provisions for petroleum are a subsidy administered 
through the revenue side of the budget. Other mineral 
industries may also claim percentage depletion. See 
Susan Agria for a detailed discussion of the special tax 
provisions for mineral industries. 
2 The authors (1973a, b), and Wright. 
3 Even a finding that the tax-subsidy policy was cost- 
effective in increasing petroleum reserve investment 
would not, of course, necessarily imply that the policy 
is "in the public interest," since tradeoffs with other 
programs would not be considered. See the authors 
(1975a) for a preliminary application of the cost- 
effectiveness approach to evaluating the special tax 
provisions. 
4 The five states are Kansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, and Texas. According to American Petro- 
leum Institute (API) et al. (1972), they contain about 
75 percent of U.S. proved reserves outside Alaska. The 
operation of market-demand prorationing is discussed 
in detail in Sections I and IV below. 
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though a complete analysis of the three 
public policies will require additional em- 
pirical estimates. 
The model is developed in Section I. The 
data sources and methodology used to out- 
fit the model for empirical testing are dis- 
cussed in Section II. The empirical results 
are reported in Section III. Finally, Sec- 
tion IV contains the conclusions, including 
the policy implications of our results. 
I. A Model of the Crude 
Petroleum Producer5 
We assume that crude petroleum pro- 
ducers maximize the present value of 
after-tax cash flow, subject to the con- 
straints of a production function and an 
accounting identity. The production func- 
tion is assumed to be CES. The accounting 
identity relates changes in petroleum re- 
serve stocks to flows of gross investment 
in reserves and current output ("deprecia- 
tion"). 
The after-tax cash flow of a crude pe- 
troleum producer is conveniently repre- 
sented as the difference between a revenue 
term and two cost terms, one for invest- 
ment (reserve acquisition) costs and one 
for other input costs. Thus after-tax cash 
flow at time t can be written as 
(1) N(t) = N1(t) - N2(t) - N3(t) 
where N, is the revenue term and N2 and 
N3 are the investment and noninvestment 
cost terms, respectively. We discuss each 
of these cash-flow components in turn. 
A crude petroleum producer must make 
royalty payments to the landowners from 
whom the drilling and production rights 
have been leased. These payments are 
customarily calculated as a percentage of 
gross revenue.6 Let (t -7r) be the propor- 
tion of gross revenue which must be paid 
in royalty; then the proportion 7r of gross 
revenue accrues to the producer. If p is the 
price and Q the quantity of marketed out- 
put, the revenue of a crude petroleum pro- 
ducer before taxes is 7rpQ. 
The after-tax revenue of a crude pe- 
troleum producer depends on several tax 
provisions. State and local governments 
assess production and severance taxes on 
both quantity of production and revenue; 
these are represented in the after-tax cash 
flow equation by the average production 
and severance tax rate y. These taxes 
are deductible from net income subject to 
the federal corporation income tax, which 
is assessed at rate u. Further deductions 
from federal tax are allowed for a propor- 
tion z of gross revenue through the per- 
centage depletion allowance. Together, 
the royalty share and the tax provisions 
determine the after-tax revenue compo- 
nent of the cash flow equation at time t: 
(2) N1(t) 1 - y(t) - u(t) 
*[1- y(t) - z(t)] }I r(t)p(t)Q(t) 
Various categories of investment cost in 
the crude petroleum industry are treated 
differently under the federal corporation 
income tax. Define the following terms: 
I(t) is total reserve acquisition cost at 
time t; qi(I(t), t) is the proportion of I(t) 
spent on drilling dry holes; q2(I(t), t) is the 
proportion of I(t) spent on "intangible" 
costs of successful wells; q3(I(t), t) is the 
proportion of I(t) spent on "tangible" 
costs of successful wells; and D(t) is the 
discounted value at time t of the time 
stream of tax deductions from one dollar of 
depreciable outlays made at time t. The 
three proportions qj sum to one at any 
time t. 
Dry-hole costs qil and intangible costs 5 In constructing the model, we have benefitted from 
the earlier work on investment in manufacturing by 
Dale Jorgenson (1965, 1967) and by Robert Hall and 
Jorgenson. Throughout the present paper, "petroleum" 
refers to crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids. 
6 Stephen McDonald (1963, p. 18), explains how the 
royalty payment comes "off the top" before tax liability 
is calculated. 
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q21 are fully deductible from gross income 
in the year in which they are incurred. 
Tangible costs q3I must be capitalized and 
depreciated over a number of years; there- 
fore the time t value of the tax deductions 
they provide is Dq3I. Thus we have the 
after-tax investment cost component of 
the cash-flow equation at time t: 
(3) N2(t) = { [1- U(t) ] [ql (I (t),~ t) +qf2(I (t) ,t)] 
+[1-u(t)D(t)]q3(I(t), t)}I(t) 
Other input cost categories are also 
treated differently under the federal corpo- 
ration income tax. Define the following 
terms: L is an index of the quantities of 
nonreserve inputs into the production of 
crude petroleum; w, is the expensible cost 
per unit of L; w2 iS the depreciable cost per 
unit of L; and w3 is the nondeductible cost 
per unit of L for producers taking per- 
centage depletion rather than cost deple- 
tion. Then the noninvestment cost com- 
ponent of the cash-flow equation at time 
t is 
(4) N3(t) = [1 - U(t)]wl(t) 
+ [1- u(t) D(t)]w2(t) + w3(t) } L(t) 
The quantity of output at time t is con- 
strained by the differentiable implicit pro- 
duction function 
(5) F(Q(t), Q(t), L(t), t) = 0 
The variable Q is the full-time equivalent 
stock of proved reserves; we specify the 
proved reserves input that way instead of 
simply as the stock of proved reserves be- 
cause of market-demand prorationing 
(MDP). MDP limits the use of the produc- 
tive services of proved petroleum reserves. 
For example, the Texas Railroad Commis- 
sion (TRRC) formerly imposed "shutdown 
days" on the operation of wells subject to 
its control.7 Thus if there had been fifteen 
shutdown days in a month of thirty days, 
the market-demand factor S would have 
been 
30 - 15 (6) S=0.5= 
If MDP were actually enforced as the 
name shutdown days suggests, by shutting 
wells down completely part of the time, 
the full-time equivalent of a stock of re- 
serves R would be simply SR; the flow of 
services from the stock of reserves could 
then be assumed proportional to SR. In 
fact, MDP is enforced differently; a con- 
trolled well is permitted to operate every 
day, so long as total output for the month 
does not exceed the quantity S times the 
"rated allowable" capacity of the well 
(which the TRRC also determines). Pro- 
ducers may therefore choose to obtain a 
given flow of productive services from 
fewer proved reserves than if they were 
forced to shut down part of the time; if so, 
they will utilize their reserves more in- 
tensively than they would under a literal 
shutdown days scheme. To include this 
possibility, we write Q as the function 
(7) Q(t) = S(t)6R(t), 0 < S(t) < 1, 
0 < 0 
where 0 is the elasticity of the full-time 
equivalent stock of reserves with respect 
to the market-demand factor S. A literal 
shutdown days scheme would be the spe- 
cial case of (7) where 0 equals 1. If 0 is less 
than 1, it would mean that prorationed 
producers hold a smaller stock of reserves 
for any flow of productive services under 
actual MDP than under literal shutdown 
days. A value of 0 greater than 1 would 
have the opposite implication; this case 
seems unlikely, but the actual value of 0 is, 
of course, an empirical question. 
Gross additions to proved reserves at 
time t are represented by the differentiable 
function 4(I(t), t). The function 4 is as- 
7 In 1963, the TRRC ceased using shutdown days and 
began setting "market demand factors" directly in per- 
centage terms, as in statement (6). As the text indicates, 
the two regulatory procedures are equivalent. 
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sumed to be increasing and strictly con- 
cave in I (expenditures on acquiring re- 
serves) for all values of t. This representa- 
tion assumes that at every point in time, 
as the size of the reserve acquisition pro- 
gram increases, the marginal addition to 
reserves per dollar spent decreases. This 
might occur, for example, if the proportion 
of "dry holes" increased or if the average 
quantity of proved reserves per successful 
well diminished. 
Let r(t) be the time-rate of change of 
the stock of proved reserves, dR(t)/dt. 
Then we have the accounting relation 
(capital stock equation of motion) 
(8) r(t) = O(I(t), t) -Q(t) 
That is, the rate of change of the stock of 
proved reserves at time t must equal the 
rate of gross additions to reserves at time t 
less the rate of output from reserves at 
time t. 
The assumed objective of a petroleum 
producer is maximization of the present 
value of after-tax cash flow, 
t 
(9) V N(t)e dt 
where i(s) is the after-tax rate of interest. 
The solution to the problem of maximizing 
(9), subject to (5), (7), and (8), can be 
found by maximizing the Lagrangian func- 
tion 
00 
(10) fg(t) dt 
J{N(t) +X(t)F(Q(t), S(t)9.R(t), L(t), t) 
+i,(t) [(I(t), t)-Q(t)-r(t)] } i(s)dst 
Substituting (1)-(4) into (10), we find the 
Euler necessary conditions to be equations 
(5) and (8), plus the following: 
Og(t) OF 
(1 1) 0=- -= (t)- 
OQ(t) OQ(t) 
+ { -y(t) - u(t) 
[1- y(t) -z(t) ]} Ir(t)p(t) - 0(t) 
Og9(t) clOF (12) 0 - - (t) OL(t) OL(t) 
- I [1 - u(t)]wl(t) 
+ [1 - u(t)D(t)]w2(t) + w3(t)} 
Og(t) _ O4 (13) 0 1(t) - r(t) 
-t [1-u(t)][qj(I(t), t)+q2 (1(t) , t)] 
+ [1-u(t) D(t) ]q3(I(t), t) } 
-({[1- (t)] Oq + Oq2 1 
O1(t) OI( QJ 
+ [1-u(t) D(t) ] dI I(t) 
a1(t) 
(14) 0 =9g(t) d Og(t) 
OR(t) dt clr(t) 
OF dq(t) 
- X(t)S(t)y a- + -t -i(t>,(t) oa2(t) dt 
The preceding necessary conditions can 
be used to derive the investment functions 
implicit in the model. We first derive and 
interpret one argument of those functions, 
namely, the output-input, after-tax rela- 
tive price variable. Then we assume a spe- 
cific form of the production function to 
derive the investment functions; their dis- 
crete approximations comprise the esti- 
mating equations used in the empirical 
work. 
The first step is to show that the neces- 
sary conditions imply that a petroleum pro- 
ducer should set the marginal product of 
its stock of reserves equal to the ratio of 
the marginal after-tax cost of holding re- 
serves to the marginal after-tax net re- 
turn from producing reserves. Using equa- 
tions (5) and (7) and the implicit function 
theorem, we find 
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(15) aQ(t) = -S(Q0 x(t)OF/9Q(t) 
MR(t) X(t)c1F/c1Q(t) 
Equations (11) and (14) imply 
(16) -S(t)6 -()F/Q = 
X(t)cIF/clQ(t) 
i (t) n(t) - 67(t) Idt 
{ 1-y(t)-u(t) [1-y(t)-z(t)II r(t)p(t)-n(t) 
Equations (15) and (16) imply 
'1 a Q(t) = 1 dq (t) 1 
AR(t) [ {it (t) dt} t]* 
[{ 1-y(t)-u(t) [1-y(t)-Z(t)] } r(t) P(t)-7(t)I 
The left-hand side of (17) is obviously the 
marginal product of the stock of reserves. 
We now show that the right-hand side of 
(17) is the ratio of the marginal after-tax 
net cost of holding reserves to the marginal 
after-tax net return from producing re- 
serves. Consider first the numerator. From 
(13), we see that q(t) is the marginal after- 
tax cost of a unit of proved reserves;' 
therefore [1/1q(t)] [d-q(t)1dt] is the own- 
rate of interest on reserves. Since i(t) is the 
after-tax monetary rate of interest, the 
numerator of the right-hand side of (17) is 
the marginal after-tax net cost of holding 
a unit of reserves. Next consider the 
denominator. The first term { 1-y(t)- 
u(t) [1 -y(t) - z(t)] } Iir(t)p(t) is the margi- 
nal after-tax revenue from selling a unit of 
output. The second term q(t) is the margi- 
nal after-tax cost of a unit of reserves to 
replace that which is produced. The differ- 
ence between the two terms is the marginal 
after-tax net return from producing a unit 
of reserves. 
The right-hand side of (17) is the inverse 
of the output-input, after-tax relative 
price variable h, which is shown below to 
be an argument of the investment func- 
tions: 
(18) h(t)= 
[{ 1-Y(t)-u(t) [1-y(t)-z(t)]}Xr(t)P(t)-r7(t)I 
FJt\ dn(t7 , 
[dt} 
We assume a CES production function, 
(19) Q(t) = Aert{a Q(t)-v 
+ (1 -a)L(t)-v-blv 
where A > 0 is the scale parameter; zy : 0 is 
the rate of technological change; aC (0, 1) 
is the input-intensity parameter; (1+v)-1 
E (0, 1 ] is the elasticity of factor substitu- 
tion, restricted so that both inputs are 
necessary for positive production; and 
bC (0, 1 ] is the degree of homogeneity, re- 
stricted so that the production function is 
concave. Equations (7) and (19) imply 
that the marginal product of reserves is 
(20) RQ(t) -aQ(t) aR(t) 
aR(t) aQ(t) (9R(t) 
abA-v/b[eIt]-vfb[Q(t)] (1?vlb) [R(t)]- (1+v [S(t)]-ev 
From equations (17), (18), and (20), we 
obtain the following expression for the 
optimal stock of proved reserves: 
(21) R(t) = [abA -vlb11(1+v) 
* [h(t)]I/(?+V) [Q(t)](b+v)Ib(+1v) 
* [S(t)]-O/(1?+) [eYt]-v1b(1+v) 
Taking a logarithmic transformation of 
(21) yields the optimal reserves stock 
equation 
(22) In R(t) = ao + a, In h(t) + a2 In Q(t) 
+ a3 In S(t) + a4t 
where: 
8 Let ,= [(1-u) (ql+q2) + ( 1-uD)q ] + [(1-i) (Oq1/dI 
+3q2/I) + (1 -uD)3q3/dI ]I in equation (13). Note that 
,8 is the marginal change in the time t value of after-tax 
cash flow with respect to investment expenditure. From 
(13), 7 =13 (a4vaI)-'. Since ao/aI is the marginal increase 
in reserves from investment expenditure, (ad/OI)-1 is 
the marginal before-tax cost of reserves; hence 1(aoa/dI) ' 
is the marginal after-tax cost of reserves at time t. 
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1 
(23) ao [In a + In b] 
+ v 
v 




b + v 
b(l + v) 
Ov 




Replacing continuous time by discrete 
time in (22), and adding the error term Et, 
we get the reserves stock estimating equa- 
tion 
(24) In Rt = ao + a, In ht + ac ln Qt 
+ a3 In St + a4t + Et 
Differentiation of (22) yields the propor- 







Replacing continuous time by discrete 
time in (25), and adding the error term Et, 
we get the proportional net investment 
estimating equation 
ARt Aht AQt 
(26) =a4 + a,-- +a2 
Rt St Qt 
+ a3 -- + Et 
St 
The net investment estimating equation 
with error term Et' is 
(27) A In Rt = a4 + alAIn ht + a2 Iln Qt 
+ a3A InSt + E' 
Equation (27) can be derived either by 
taking a first-order Taylor series approxi- 
mation of (22), or by taking first differ- 
ences in (24). 
II. Data Sources 
In this section, we discuss the selection 
and use of empirical measures of the cost of 
acquiring proved reserves and of the out- 
put and price of crude petroleum. We also 
briefly describe the other data used in the 
estimations. 
A. Cost of Acquiring Petroleum Reserves 
The only suitable data on reserve ac- 
quisition costs which are broken down by 
state are those published by the Joint As- 
sociation Survey (JAS) for "costs of 
drilling and equipping wells" (hereafter 
D&E costs). These data are available sep- 
arately for successful oil wells, successful 
gas wells, and total dry holes; they appear 
to cover the vast bulk of "proving up" out- 
lays. The JAS series on D&E costs is only 
available continuously for the years 1959- 
71, restricting the empirical estimations to 
thirteen observations.9 
B. Current Petroleum Output and Price 
For the output variable Q, U.S. Bureau 
9 American Petroleum Institute (API) et al., Section 
I. The D&E costs include only the "Christmas tree" on 
wells to be used in production. The procedures underly- 
ing the JAS data have been criticized by Franklin 
Fisher; we have not evaluated the data published since 
Fisher wrote (i.e., those for 1961-71), but the methodol- 
ogy appears to have been substantially improved (see, 
e.g., Morris Adelman, p. 121). JAS published D&E 
costs for 1953, 1955, and 1956, but not for 1954 or 1957 
and 1958; the early data are of much lower quality than 
those for 1959-71. The Chase Manhattan Bank (CMB) 
and the JAS (API et al., Section II) publish series on 
exploration and development outlays but only for the 
entire United States. The CMB series would not be 
suitable for econometric work because it is intended as 
information for investors, not as a consistently defined 
time-series. Moreover, it includes production facilities 
beyond the "Christmas tree." 
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of Mines (USBM) data were used in con- 
structing a Divisia quantity index'0 of cur- 
rent outputs of oil, natural gas (nonasso- 
ciated and associated-dissolved), and natu- 
ral gas liquids-i.e., all petroleum produc- 
tion from which revenue was received.'1 
The USBM natural gas figure used in the 
output Divisia index was "marketed out- 
put," which is equal to "gross" output 
from oil and gas wells, less "repressuring" 
and "losses." 
For the price variable p, a Divisia price 
index of oil, natural gas, and natural gas 
liquids was constructed. For oil and natu- 
ral gas liquids, USBM data on values 
realized "at the well" (oil) and "at plants" 
(natural gas liquids), divided by the ap- 
propriate USBM output figure, were used. 
For natural gas, the relevant price for de- 
cisions on new reserves in year t is the 
price obtained on new contracts made in 
that year, not average realized prices 
which include sales under long-term con- 
tracts made in years past; accordingly, a 
series for "new contract" prices prepared 
by Foster Associates for the Energy Policy 
Project was used. 
C. Other Data Sources 
1) The stock of proved reserves R. An- 
nual data on end-of-year proved reserves 
of oil and natural gas, in American Pe- 
troleum Institute, American Gas Associa- 
tion, and Canadian Petroleum Association, 
were used in a Divisia index of reserves. 
2) Market-demand factor S. The values 
of this variable were those set by the 
TRRC; the annual market-demand factor 
was calculated as a percentage equal to the 
average of the twelve monthly figures. 
3) U.S. corporate income tax rate u. 
Data for 1959-69 were obtained from 
Joseph Pechman, p. 118; the rates for 1970 
and 1971 were taken from the U.S. In- 
ternal Revenue Code. 
4) Percentage depletion rate z. The 
statutory percentage depletion rate was 
used for want of a time-series of the effec- 
tive rate; the latter rate would be less than 
the former because of the net income 
limitation. 
5) Average production and severance 
tax rate y. This rate was calculated from 
data in API et al., Section II, on state and 
local taxes paid on oil and gas production, 
divided by the total value of petroleum 
production. 
6) Discounted value at time t of $1 of de- 
preciable cost incurred at time t, D. Iter- 
ations from 0.4 to 0.8 in increments of 0.1 
showed very little variation in the results. 
We used the conservatively high value of 
D= 0.8, which is the approximate value 
of $1 of depreciable cost over five years 
at 12 percent by the sum-of-years-digits 
depreciation method (see Hall and Jorgen- 
son). 
7) Interest rate i. Two alternative time- 
series for the after-tax rate of interest were 
used. (a) The quantity (1-u) times 
Moody's index of all "industrial" bond 
yields, for thirty-six bonds, referred to as 
the "debt" interest rate. (b) The quantity 
(1 - u) times the inverse of Standard and 
Poor's composite "price-earnings ratio," 
referred to as the "equity" interest rate. 
8) Royalty share (1 -7-). Based on in- 
formation in McDonald (1971, p. 14, and 
1963, p. 103, n. 132), we iterated over 
values from 0.10 to 0.20. Since the empiri- 
cal results varied little between iterations, 
we follow API et al., Section II, and report 
the results for a royalty share of 15 per- 
cent. 
III. Empirical Estimations 
In this section, we first discuss the con- 
struction of the relative price variable h 
from the data discussed in Section II. We 
10 On Divisia quantity and price indexes, see Herman 
Wold and Lars Jureen, and Jorgenson and Griliches. 
11 The USBM data are given in convenient form 
through 1969 in API. For 1970 and 1971, the USBM's 
Mineral Industry Surveys were used. 
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then report ordinary least squares esti- 
mates of the reserves investment equations 
derived in Section I. 
The first step in constructing the time- 
series of h was to calculate an average-cost 
proxy for the marginal after-tax cost of 
reserves I defined by (13). To separate 
D&E costs on successful wells into in- 
tangible (expensible) and tangible (depre- 
ciable) components, we regressed intangi- 
bles on total D&E costs for successful oil 
wells and for successful gas wells, using 
JAS data for 1959-64. The total figure for 
each type of well was then multiplied by 
the fitted slope coefficient and by one 
minus the coefficient to obtain intangible 
and tangible costs, respectively.'2 
The time-series of average costs of ac- 
quiring reserves by type of tax treatment 
were then obtained by dividing dry-hole, 
intangible, and tangible D&E costs by 
gross additions to petroleum reserves. Let 
A, be a Divisia quantity index of (Rt-RRt, 
+Qt) for crude oil and nonassociated 
natural gas in year t. Also let Xdt, X,t, and 
Xgt be D&E costs in year t on dry holes, 
successful crude oil wells, and successful 
gas wells, respectively. Finally, let f3 and 
da be the estimated proportions of intangi- 
bles in D&E costs in year t for successful 
oil wells and successful gas wells, respec- 
tively. Then for year t the average dry- 
hole cost of new reserves was calculated as 
Xdt/At; the average intangible cost of new 
reserves was (f3Xct+3gX,t)/At; and the 
average tangible cost of new reserves was 
[( 1-0,)X,t+ ( 1-0g)Xgt 1A/t. 
The last step in calculating the average- 
cost proxy for the time-series of -j was to 
multiply the above dry-hole and intangible 
costs by (1 - u) and to multiply the above 
tangible costs by (1 - uD). The time-series 
of vi in turn was combined with the produc- 
tion-tax rate y, the percentage depletion 
rate z, the royalty share ir, the price index 
of petroleum production p, and the rate of 
interest i, to calculate the time-series of 
the output-input, after-tax relative price 
variable h, given by (18). There is no time 
trend in the time-series of j; the ratio of 
the variance to the mean of the series is 
less than 0.2 percent. This allowed us to 
assume that over the time period covered 
by our data, the own-rate of interest on 
proved reserves was zero. Consequently, 
the term [1/j7(t) ] [dq(t)jdt] was set equal 
to zero in calculating the time-series of h. 
Market price p is a component of h, and 
the quantity of output Q enters the esti- 
mating equations as another explanatory 
variable. During the period covered by 
our data, authorities in the five proration- 
ing states effectively controlled the price 
of crude oil through the policy of MDP 
(under the protective cover of the import 
quota). By varying the market-demand 
factor, the state authorities in effect 
selected price-quantity pairs from the do- 
mestic demand curve. It is therefore ap- 
propriate in the following regressions to 
assume that market price and output were 
both exogenously determined variables 
over the period studied.'3 
The results of least squares regressions 
for the estimating equations derived in 
Section I, using the data described in Sec- 
tion II and the procedures detailed above, 
are reported in Table 1 (debt interest 
rate) and Table 2 (equity interest rate). 
Given the small number of degrees of free- 
dom, the results of the least-squares regres- 
sions are encouraging. All estimated coeffi- 
cients of explanatory variables are highly 
12 The JAS definitions of intangibles and tangibles 
correspond closely to those in the federal tax law (e.g., 
API et al., 1964, section 1, pp. 7-8). Scatter diagrams 
of intangibles against total D&E costs for successful 
wells indicated very tight linear fits for both oil and gas 
wells. Least squares regressions gave R2 > 0.999; the 
constant terms were not significant. 
13 For further explanation of this point, see fn. 17 and 
the accompanying discussion in Section IV below. 
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TABLE 1-REGRESSION RESULTS: DEBT INTEREST RATE 
Coefficients 
ht Qt St tS 2 DW F 
ao acl a2 as a4 
(24) In Rt 4.3423 .0335 .8667 -.1719 -.0275 .9734 2.0823 110.7915 
(2.99) (4.18) (9.40) (16.92) (7.17) 
(26) ARt/Rt - .0443 .9081 -.1877 -.0292 .8919 2.1853 31.2575 
(5.11) (7.12) (8.62) (6.06) 
(27) Mln Rt - .0379 .8488 -.1699 -.0266 .8507 2.1009 21.8947 
(4.16) (5.96) (7.17) (4.84) 
Note: Absolute values of I-ratios in parentheses. R2=coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom. 
DW= Durbin-Watson statistic; null hypothesis of no serial correlation, DW= 2.0. F= F-statistic; F(4, 8) for equation 
(24) and F(3, 8) for equations (26) and (27). 
TABLE 2-REGRESSION RESULTS: EQUITY INTEREST RATE 
Coefficients 
ht Qt St t I2 DW F 
ao al a2 a3 a4 
(24) In Rt 3.6807 .0332 .9078 -.1893 -.0295 .9723 2.4401 106.1457 
(2.55) (4.06) (9.93) (18.42) (7.89) 
(26) zRt/Rt .0299 .9644 -.1898 -.0338 .8417 2.3299 20.5016 
(3.91) (6.30) (7.10) (6.04) 
(27) A In Rt .0297 .9176 -.1789 -.0308 .8185 2.5032 17.5367 
(3.58) (5.91) (6.60) (5.32) 
Note: See Table 1 for explanation of terms. 
significant; moreover, they are quite stable 
between the stock and the flow estimating 
equations. The W2 are relatively high; in- 
deed, we expected worse fits for the first- 
difference equations, (26) and (27). The 
Durbin-Watson statistics evidence virtu- 
ally no serial correlation of the residuals 
for the debt interest rate and only a weak 
tendency towards negative serial correla- 
tion with the equity interest rate.'4 The 
F-statistics for all six equations estimated 
exceed the confidence values at the 1 per- 
cent level of significance. 
The signs of the estimated coefficients 
reported in Tables 1 and 2 can be in- 
terpreted as follows. For the stock equa- 
tion (24), producers held a larger stock of 
proved reserves during the period studied, 
ceteris paribus, (a) the higher was the out- 
put-input relative price variable (ai>0); 
(b) the higher was the rate of current pe- 
troleum output (a2> 0); (C) the smaller 
was the market-demand factor (a3 <0);15 
14 Our colleague, Ronald Ehrenberg, has pointed out 
that regardless of the calculated values of the Durbin- 
Watson statistics for the equations estimated, the ap- 
parent absence of serially correlated residuals can be 
true for only the stock equation or the flow equations 
but not for both simultaneously. 
15 One might be tempted to think that a more strin- 
gent (smaller) value of the market-demand factor would 
have reduced the stock of reserves by raising the price 
of the effective flow of reserve services into the produc- 
tion of crude petroleum (e.g., Adelman, p. 106). In fact, 
producers were forced by the policy of MDP to increase 
the reserve/output ratio for any given level of output. 
Hence the negative relationship which we find is the 
one to be expected. 
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TABLE 3-IMPLIED PARAMETER VALUES: 
DEBT INTEREST RATE 
Parameters 
Equations 1/(1+v) b 0 y 
(24)ln Rt .0335 1.1599 .1779 .0330 
(26) ARt/Rt .0443 1.1064 .1964 .0338 
(27) A In Rt .0379 1.1865 .1766 .0327 
Note: We lack information to solve explicitly for A 
(scale parameter) and a (input-intensity parameter); 
see (23). 
and (d) the lower was the rate of techno- 
logical change (a4<0). For analogous in- 
terpretations of the two flow equations 
(26) and (27), add a modifying phrase, 
"proportional change in" or "change in," 
where appropriate in the above interpreta- 
tion of the stock equation. 
We report in Tables 3 and 4 the values 
of the production function parameters 
1/(1+v), b, 6, and y which from (23) are 
implied by the estimated coefficients re- 
ported in Tables 1 and 2. The estimates of 
1/(l+v), which is the elasticity of substi- 
tution between reserves and nonreserve 
inputs and is equal to the coefficient a1, 
are contained in (0, 1 ] as required by our 
specification of the production function. In 
addition, the values of the elasticity of 
substitution are quite small, plausibly sug- 
gesting that it is difficult to substitute non- 
reserve inputs for proved reserves in pro- 
ducing crude petroleum. The estimates of 
b, 0, and -y are biased because they are 
non-linear functions of the a3. The esti- 
mates of b, which is the homogeneity pa- 
rameter and is equal to (ai-1)/(aj-a2), 
are not contained in (0, 1 ] as required by 
our specification of the production func- 
tion. The estimates of 0, which is the elas- 
ticity of the full-time equivalent stock of 
reserves with respect to the market-de- 
mand factor and is equal to a3/(al- 1), are 
positive as required by (7); they are also 
much smaller than unity, suggesting that 
crude petroleum producers in the prora- 
TABLE 4 IMPLIED PARAMETER VALUES: 
EQUITY INTEREST RATE 
Parameters 
Equations 1/(1-+v) b 0 7 
(24) In Rt .0332 1.1054 .1958 .0337 
(26) ARt/Rt .0299 1.0381 .1957 .0362 
(27) A In Rt .0297 1.0928 .1844 .0347 
Note: See Table 3 for explanation. 
tioning sector did indeed respond to MDP 
by utilizing their proved reserves more in- 
tensively than they would have under 
literal "shutdown days" prorationing. Fi- 
nally, the estimates of ry, which can be 
interpreted as the rate of technological 
change and is equal to a4/(a,i- a2), are 
nonnegative as required by our specifica- 
tion of the production function; further- 
more, the implied values of 3.3 to 3.6 per- 
cent per annum are reasonable. 
IV. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Our empirical estimates of the determi- 
nants of investment in crude petroleum re- 
serves in the prorationing sector of the 
U.S. petroleum industry for 1959-71 are 
consistent with the model of investment in 
crude petroleum reserves presented in Sec- 
tion I. The results indicate that several 
public policies have significantly affected 
investment in reserves in the prorationing 
sector. Three of the four explanatory vari- 
ables depend on instruments of govern- 
ment control. The relative price variable 
is a function of the special federal corpora- 
tion income tax provisions for petroleum. 
The market-demand factor is under the 
direct control of state prorationing au- 
thorities. In addition, both those authori- 
ties and the federal government exercised 
control over crude oil price and quantity 
during the period studied, through the 
policies of MDP and the oil import quota, 
respectively. 
Two of the three policies had direct par- 
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tial effects on investment in petroleum re- 
serves which can be inferred from our esti- 
mates. In addition, all three policies had 
indirect partial effects through induced 
changes in equilibrium price and quantity, 
which can also be inferred from our esti- 
mates. The total effects can be determined 
from our results if both the direct and the 
indirect effects have the same sign; other- 
wise, further information is required. We 
consider first the direct and then the in- 
direct policy effects on petroleum reserves. 
The special federal tax provisions for 
petroleum corporation income increase the 
value of the relative price variable h, given 
the price of petroleum output.'6 Thus the 
significantly positive estimates of a, imply 
that those provisions increased investment 
in reserves compared to uniform tax treat- 
ment. Similarly, the significant positive 
estimates of a3 imply that setting the 
market-demand factor S at less than unity 
increased investment in reserves compared 
to the absence of effective MDP (S= 1). 
The oil import quota indirectly affected 
investment in prorationing-sector petro- 
leum reserves by restricting the quantity 
of imports. Given the market-demand fac- 
tor and the special tax provisions, reduced 
imports would lead to a higher price in the 
U.S. market; the higher price in turn 
would induce an increase in quantity sup- 
plied in the prorationing sector. Therefore, 
the significantly positive estimates of a, 
and a2, the coefficients on relative price 
and output, imply that the oil import 
quota increased investment in petroleum 
reserves. 
The indirect effects on petroleum re- 
serves of the special tax provisions and 
MDP involve shifts in the petroleum sup- 
ply curve. It can be shown that the model 
developed in Section I leads to a prora- 
tioning-sector supply function relating 
quantity supplied to the market-demand 
factor, time, and two output-input rela- 
tive price variables, our h and another 
relative price, which we have not explicitly 
defined, for the nonreserve input. In order 
to represent the supply function as a 
family of supply curves in price-quantity 
space, we define the following variable: 
(2)c()=(t) {1y(t) -u(t) [1 -y(t)- z(t)] 
Given the assumption of a zero own-rate 
of interest on reserves (see Section III), 
statements (18) and (28) imply 
(29) h ~P(tW (29) (t) p c(t) i(t) 
Then holding constant the price of the non- 
reserve input and the rate of interest, 
quantity supplied in the prorationing sec- 
tor at time t is an increasing function of p 
and S and a decreasing function of c. A 
similar argument leads to a supply func- 
tion for the nonprorationing sector which 
is increasing in p and decreasing in c; the 
market-demand factor S does not, of 
course, appear in the nonprorationing- 
sector supply function. Since total do- 
mestic supply is the sum of the quantities 
supplied by the two sectors, the total sup- 
ply function can be represented by the 
family of supply curves Q(.) in the price- 
quantity space of Figure 1. 
Let D(p) in Figure 1 be the demand 
curve for petroleum in the domestic mar- 
ket. Then suppose that the special tax 
provisions were made more generous, so 
that c decreased from (say) c" to c'; as a 
result, the supply curve would shift from 
Q(p, c", S') to Q(p, c', 5'). Given D(p), the 
shift in supply would in turn reduce equi- 
librium price from pb to pa and increase the 
16 From (18), h is seen to be an increasing function of 
the rate of percentage depletion z. It can be seen from 
(13) that the expensing of intangible drilling costs trans- 
fers marginal acquisition costs in the amount [q2+I(aq2 
IaI) ] from a term with weight [1 -uD] to a term with 
the smaller weight [1-u ]. 
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quantity supplied from Qb to Qa. Part of 
the increase in quantity supplied would 
come from the prorationing sector. Thus 
making the special tax provisions more 
generous would (ceteris paribus) reduce 
market price and increase the quantity 
supplied (and vice versa for making the 
provisions less generous). 
To isolate the indirect effects of varying 
the special tax provisions, we take the dif- 
ferential of (22), set dSt and dt equal to 
zero, and use (29) to obtain 
(30) dRt = -aCp dct 
(Ct) 2ht 
+a2Rt [aiPt E] 
+-[ - Et] dpt 
Pt cx2ctht 
where Et is the price elasticity of demand 
for petroleum at time t. The first term on 
the right-hand side of (30) is the direct 
effect on reserves of changes in the special 
tax provisions; since dct is negative, the 
sign of this term is positive, which is con- 
sistent with our earlier finding that the 
direct effect of the special tax provisions 
was to increase reserves. 
The second expression on the right-hand 
side of (30) is the indirect effect on reserves 
of changing the special tax provisions. As 
noted above in discussing Figure 1, making 
those provisions more generous reduces 
the market price. Therefore dpt is negative 
and, since a2 is positive, the sign of the in- 
direct effect is the opposite of the sign of 
the term in brackets. The latter sign is 
analytically indeterminate, depending on 
whether aipt/a2ctht is greater or less than 
Et. To place limits on the sign of the 
bracketed term, we calculated the values 
of acPtaj2ctht, using the estimates of a, and 
a2 (see Tables 1 and 2) plus the observed 
figures for pt, h,, and ct for 1959-71; these 
values vary from 0.0366 to 0.0659. There- 
fore the bracketed expression in (30) was 
negative in each year between 1959 and 
1971 in which the price elasticity of de- 
mand for crude petroleum exceeded 0.0659. 
If the bracketed expression was negative, 
the indirect effect as a whole would have 
been positive, thereby reinforcing the di- 
rect effect. On the assumption that Et was 
larger throughout he period than the very 
low value of 0.0659, we tentatively con- 
clude that both the direct and the indirect 
effects of the special tax provisions in- 
creased the stock of proved reserves of 
petroleum. 
To examine the indirect effect of market- 
demand prorationing on reserves, let us be- 
gin with the supply curve Q(p, c', S") in 
Figure 1. Now suppose MDP is made more 
stringent by a reduction in the market- 
demand factor from S" to S'. We showed 
above that this reduction would directly 
increase the stock of petroleum reserves. 
There would also be an indirect effect, 
however, since moving from S" to S' would 
shift the supply curve in Figure 1 from 
Q(p, c', S"') to Q(p, c', S').17 As a result, 
equilibrium price would increase from pc 
to pa and total quantity supplied would 
decrease from Qc to Qa. By reasoning 
17 The ability to shift the supply curve in market 
price-output space is the reason why effective MDP 
enables the prorationing boards to pick points on the 
demand curve. Thus, so long as prorationing is effective, 
market price and output are exogenous to the proration- 
ing sector producer. 
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analogous to that above for the special tax 
provisions, the indirect effect of MDP 
would be a decrease in reserves, provided 
that the price elasticity of demand for 
crude petroleum was greater than 0.0659. 
Because the direct and indirect effects have 
opposite signs in this case, the direction of 
the total effect of MDP on petroleum re- 
serves cannot be determined from our esti- 
mates alone. Additional information on the 
supply and demand functions is required 
to determine the net total effect. 
The Arab embargo of October 1973 has 
prompted interest in the question of na- 
tional "independence" in oil. Independence 
can be defined as having the capacity for 
self-sufficiency-that is, the capability of 
being independent of foreign suppliers if 
the need arises. It can be promoted 
through actual self-sufficiency in produc- 
tion or through holding excess domestic 
capacity which can be used in the event 
that foreign supplies are disrupted. For a 
depletable resource such as petroleum, in- 
creasing domestic output in order to pur- 
sue self-sufficiency in production in one 
period will make it more expensive to be 
self-sufficient or to hold excess capacity in 
later periods. In contrast, a policy which 
promotes independence by inducing do- 
mestic producers to hold excess capacity 
need not mortgage future independence by 
increasing the present rate of depletion of 
the resource.'8 
An interesting question is whether past 
public policies have contributed to or de- 
tracted from national independence in oil. 
Proponents of those policies have claimed 
that they promoted a "strong petroleum 
industry" and thus increased "national 
security." Our empirical estimates permit 
us to shed some light on this question. In 
what follows, we analyze the effects of 
past policies on self-sufficiency as measured 
by the quantity of imports; discussion of 
policy effects on alternative measures of 
self-sufficiency is relegated to footnotes. 
We also analyze the effects of past policies 
on independence as measured by the ratio 
of imports to domestic proved reserves; be- 
cause reserves are a measure of productive 
capacity, this ratio is one index of the 
capability of the domestic petroleum in- 
dustry to replace imports. 
We saw above that, ceteris paribus,'9 the 
indirect effects of the special petroleum 
tax provisions were transmitted in part 
through an increase in domestic quantity 
supplied. Given that the oil import quota 
was administered by limiting imports to 
a fixed percentage of domestic produc- 
tion,20 the increase in domestic production 
led to an increase in the quantity of im- 
ports. Thus the special tax provisions 
tended to reduce self-sufficiency in oil dur- 
ing the period 1959-71.21 In addition, the 
increased domestic production caused the 
faster depletion of domestic petroleum re- 
sources; hence the existence of the special 
tax provisions in the past has made the 
present pursuit of independence more 
costly. Finally, we saw above that the total 
effect of the special tax provisions was 
probably to increase investment in proved 
reserves. Since those provisions also in- 
creased imports, we cannot determine their 
net effect on past independence in oil as 
18 These points are fully explained in the authors' 
paper, 1975b. 
19 All changes and effects discussed below are partial 
ones. 
20 James Burrows and Thomas Domencich, p. 12; 
Cabinet Task Force, p. 10. There was a gradual accumu- 
lation of exceptions to this policy criterion but they are 
irrelevant to an analysis of partial effects. 
21 Other measures of self-sufficiency are the ratio of 
imports to domestic production Qm/QdI, and the ratio of 
imports to total domestic quantity demanded Qm/D. 
Given the wav the import quota was administered, the 
first measure Qm/Qd could not be changed by any other 
petroleum policy. Because the special tax provisions in- 
creased both Qm and D, the second measure Q,,/D would 
have varied with tax policy; unfortunately, our esti- 
mates do not enable us to calculate the relative magni- 
tudes of the two increases. Note that a different admin- 
istration of the oil import quota would have led to other 
conclusions about tax policy effects on the several 
measures of self-sufficiency and independence. 
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measured by the ratio of imports to proved 
reserves. 
As we showed above, the policy of 
market-demand prorationing (MDP) re- 
duced domestic petroleum production. 
Given the way the import quota was en- 
forced, MDP therefore reduced oil imports 
and thereby increased past energy self- 
sufficiency.22 Because the direct effect of 
MDP on reserves was positive but the in- 
direct effect was negative between 1959 
and 1971, we cannot determine the net 
effect of MDP on past independence in oil 
as measured by the ratio of imports to re- 
serves. We can say, however, that past 
MDP made the present pursuit of inde- 
pendence less costly because the lower rate 
of petroleum production reduced the rate 
of depletion of domestic petroleum re- 
sources. 23 
The oil import quota, of course, reduced 
the quantity of imports compared to a 
policy of free trade in oil; thus it increased 
past self-sufficiency in oil.24 In addition, 
we found that the quota indirectly in- 
creased investment in proved reserves by 
raising the market price of petroleum. The 
combination of lower imports and greater 
reserves means that the quota increased 
past independence in oil as measured by 
the ratio of imports to reserves. The in- 
creased market price, however, led to 
larger domestic production and hence 
faster depletion of domestic petroleum re- 
sources. The oil import quota of the past 
therefore made the pursuit of present inde- 
pendence more expensive. 
A lesson in the importance of evaluating 
related public policies simultaneously rath- 
er than in isolation from one another is 
provided by the interaction between the 
import quota and the special petroleum 
tax provisions. The quota was ostensibly 
intended to promote self-sufficiency in oil. 
We saw above, however, that the special 
tax provisions in the presence of the quota 
tended to reduce self-sufficiency in oil dur- 
ing the period 1959-71 by increasing the 
quantity of imports. Ironically, had there 
been no import quota, the special tax pro- 
visions would have reduced oil imports,25 
thereby increasing self-sufficiency. Fur- 
thermore, without the quota the special 
tax provisions would have increased past 
independence in oil, in that the increase in 
reserves coupled with the reduction in im- 
ports would have decreased the import- 
reserve ratio. With the quota, in contrast, 
both the numerator and the denominator 
of the ratio were increased, leaving the 
effect on independence indeterminate. 
In conclusion, we wish to stress two im- 
plications of the preceding discussion of 
independence in oil. First, in evaluating a 
particular petroleum policy, one must take 
into account possible interactions with 
other policies; we found, for example, that 
the effects of the special tax provisions on 
self-sufficiency would have been reversed, 
had the oil import quota not existed. Sec- 
ond, our analysis reveals that past policies, 
contrary to assertions by their proponents, 
did not unambiguously promote national 
22 Using the alternative measure Qm/D, the effect of 
prorationing on self-sufficiency is qualitatively indeter- 
minate, since both components of the ratio would be 
reduced. 
23 We abstract here from the considerable inefficiencies 
due largely to overdrilling and favoritism towards 
"stripper" wells, introduced by MDP when it was an 
effective policy; see Adelman. 
24 The quota unambiguously increased self-sufficiencv 
according to the alternative measure Qm/Qd, since the 
numerator was reduced and the denominator was in- 
creased. According to the measure Qm/D, however, the 
effect is ambiguous, since both components were reduced 
(domestic quantity demanded was reduced by the 
higher market price caused by the quota). 
25 If the supply curve of imports was horizontal and 
(in the absence of an import quota) constituted the 
controlling marginal supply price in the domestic mar- 
ket, the increase in domestic supply resulting from more 
generous federal tax treatment would mean larger do- 
mestic production and hence fewer imports, since the 
total quantity demanded would not change. For an up- 
ward-sloping import supply curve, the increase in do- 
mestic supply would reduce the market price and hence 
also reduce the quantity of imports supplied in the 
market. 
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independence in oil. In designing future 
petroleum policies, then, attention should 
be paid to achieving consistency among 
different policies. Moreover, public offi- 
cials would do well to explore alternative 
sets of policies which may dominate the 
past set in the sense of offering (say) a 
lower-cost time path for national inde- 
pendence in oil (see, for example, the 
authors, 1975b). 
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